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Abstract  
Public values are being promoted as a core concept in the study of public administration, in 
particular, in discourses surrounding Moore’s public value management and Bozeman’s public value 
failure. This article outlines the approaches to the concept of values and public values. Particular 
attention is paid to the founding distinction between facts and values, which proves to be less clear 
than usually assumed. After discussing a range of possible characteristics of public values, an 
encompassing definition is attempted, which consequently has to accommodate opposing 
characteristics. It is concluded that the concept of public value is a fuzzy concept, and that is 




Public values are a hot topic in the study of public administration. A core question is, however, what 
does “public value” mean? This article aims to pinpoint the concept and its uses in contemporary 
discourse as to better understand its “uses and abuses”: Does the concept provide our field with a 
clear object of study? Attention to values is not new in the study of public administration. As I scan 
my old textbooks, I find Waldo’s (1984) famous “The administrative state,” which is concerned with 
values throughout, even though Waldo himself does not frequently use the term. Then there is 
Robbins’ (1980) “The administrative process” (p. 26), which points explicitly at a value system that 
guides all administration. And Simon’s (1976) “Administrative behavior” takes the fact–value 
distinction as a crucial notion. What is new is the rise of public values as “extraordinarily popular” 
(Rhodes & Wanna, 2007, p. 406). A wide range of studies take public values as their central object of 
study, and the number of articles discussing public values has risen substantially in the past decade 
(Van der Wal, Nabatchi, & De Graaf, 2013). Authors are dealing with ethical issues in organizations 
(Kernaghan, 2003), competing values (Selden, Brewer, & Brudney, 1999), comparing values in public 
administration and business (Van der Wal, Huberts, Van den Heuvel, & Kolthoff, 2006), they focus on 
performance and leadership (Bao, Wang, Larsen, & Morgan, 2013), and so on. 
 
Bold claims and great expectations are sometimes voiced, regarding public value as an important 
theoretical and practical “guiding concept.” For example, public value is regarded as resolving 
democratic deficits in modern public administration (Benington & Moore, 2011b, p. 261; cf. 
Benington, 2009, p. 246); it is increasingly used in administrative practice (Beck-Jørgensen, 2006, p. 
364); it is presented as “a hard-edged tool for decision-making” (quoted in Alford & O’Flynn, 2009, p. 
181), and “a rigorous way of defining, measuring and improving performance” (Cole & Parston, 
2006, p. xiii). Due to the focus on public values, it has been stated that we are even entering a “new 
era in public management” (Talbot, 2009, p. 167; cf. Stoker, 2006). Apart from a more general trend 
to refer to public values, there are two more or less independent schools or discourses that can be 
distinguished in the study of public administration that take public value as their core object of 
study.1 First, there is the discourse on public value management (PVM), initiated by Mark Moore’s 
1995 book Creating Public Value (2005). This has resulted in a research agenda that has been 
developed and adapted by many authors (cf. Alford & Hyghes, 2008; Benington, 2009; Cole & 
Parston, 2006; Meynhardt, 2009; Meynhardt & Metelmann, 2009; Stoker, 2006; Talbot, 2008, 2009), 
all of whom regard PVM as the next step after New Public Management, moving away from a state-
versus-market perspective (cf. Benington & Moore, 2011a, p. 9; O’Flynn, 2007, p. 358; Spana, 2009). 
The other discourse is more policy oriented and has recently come to center around Bozeman’s 
(2007) Public Values and Public Interest; it also roots in the 1990s, if not in Waldo’s earlier work. 
Here, the concept of public values is in opposition to dominant “economic” approaches in the 
analysis of public policies (Bozeman, 2007, p. 18). There is a more heterogeneous group of authors 
associated with this discourse, besides those specifically developing Bozeman’s public value failure 
(PVF) model (Feeney, 2008; Feeney & Bozeman, 2007; Fisher, Slade, Anderson, & Bozeman, 2010; 
Meyer, 2011; Moulton, 2009; Moulton & Bozeman, 2008). Despite all the optimism, however, after 
20 years the concept of public value has not yet gained a consensus, being used by most authors as 
an unproblematic, everyday concept that can be used fruitfully in theory and practice. More recent 
attention to its meaning has resulted in little more than an outline of the elusiveness of a clear 
definition (O’Flynn, 2007, p. 358; cf. Meynhardt, 2009, p. 204). So, an important question is how do 
authors define their core concept? And, as stated at the beginning, does public value provide the 
clear focus it is supposed to for studying public administration? The following argument concerns 
not what specific values can be regarded public values, but what the concept of public values 
amounts to. To start with the next section deals with the possible scope of the public values that are 
denoted by the concept. Next, the underlying concept of values and its definitions and peculiarities 
will be discussed. In particular, attention will be paid to the often overlooked fact/value distinction. 
Turning to public values, the very foundation or ontology of public values as either individual or 
social will be considered. This is of specific importance as the individual approach is dominant, but 
not necessarily always adequate. Finally, the definition of the concept of public values is discussed. 
The main conclusion will be that the lack of clarity of the concept and the confusing use of the term 
are problematic. Despite bold claims, the concept of public values seems to perform more of a 
heuristic function, than providing a well-defined focus for theory or praxis. Nevertheless, an 
encompassing definition will be attempted. 
 
A Pantheon of Public Values  
To begin with, it seems relevant to identify what actually are regarded public values. Phrased 
differently, what is the collection or class of phenomena the concept of public values denotes? Over 
the centuries, there has been a great deal of debate on the possible core values with which 
government and public administration should be concerned. The values espoused vary from classical 
values such as justice, prudence, freedom, democracy, health, to drinking water, education, a loyal 
bureaucracy, and even children’s playgrounds and internet access. It is well beyond the scope of this 
article to provide even a summary review of all proposed public values (cf. Rutgers, 2008). How the 
vast multitude of possible meanings relates to one another is a concern. Attempts to order and 
categorize have proved problematic. Most of the classifications put forward lack clear criteria, which 
can be illustrated by looking at one of the most elaborate texts on values by Van Wart (1998). He 
employs two different classifications in his book. The first consists of the five categories figuring the 
ethical code of the American Society of Public Administration (the ASPA Code of Ethics). The number 
five is posed as adequate and avoiding too much overlap (Van Wart, 1998, p. 5). In the second part 
of the book, Van Wart provides a specific theory as a basis for classification: “a cultural framework 
perspective,” which he adapts from Edgar Schein’s work on organization culture2 (Van Wart, 1998, 
p. 166; cf. Brocklehurst, 1998, p. 452). However, Schein distinguished three levels (cf. Schein, 1987, 
pp. 15-18, 1999, pp. 15-26), whereas Van Wart refers to four. Most importantly, Van Wart provides 
no clear way to identify values and ascribe them to specific levels, and he explicitly notes that 
consistency is not to be expected. A second example is provided by Torben Beck-Jørgensen and 
Barry Bozeman (2006). Their frequently cited article explores “the boundaries and meanings of 
public value.” They identify seven “constellations” of public values. As in the case of Van Wart, these 
categories have some overlap, that is, the same values can occur in more than one constellation. The 
constellations are based on “relationships” among values, for which purpose they identify “nodal 
values” that are central to a constellation and have many relations with other values.3 Examples of 
such nodal values are “human dignity” and “integrity.” They are not, however, necessarily the most 
important values, if only because their very meaning is a matter of debate. Building on Beck-
Jørgensen and Bozeman, I would suggest that it is rather their indeterminate and debated nature 
that makes these values central to a discourse. Thus, “integrity” is a central value because it is linked 
to many different values, in varying ways by different authors. There is, as Beck-Jørgensen and 
Bozeman suggest, a cluster or field of values concerning “integrity”: Honesty, sincerity, morality, 
loyalty, and also integrity itself fit in this cluster. Thus, the term integrity can be used to refer to a 
specific value (a specific concept), as well as to the cluster or constellation of values. This does not 
resolve the lack of (relatively) clear criteria for constructing a cluster of related values, nor can it help 
avoid overlap; it remains a contingent cluster. The foregoing indicates that public values as a generic 
concept refer to a very diverse set of concepts (i.e., values) irrespective of origin, use, relations, and 
thus meaning: It is not just a generic, relatively clear-cut concept such as “wood” or “human,” but a 
“pantheon concept.” The term pantheon serves here as a metaphor for the encompassing 
conceptualization of the contingent (empirical) collection of all possible concepts that are referred to 
as public values.4 This metaphorical term can be helpful to grasp what it means to talk about public 
values as an unproblematic, yet vague concept. Our “pantheon of public values” captures that we 
can and do heap together values as public values, even if we are unsure about the mutual relations, 
hierarchy, and even if they can coexist. It denotes, for instance, the public values in Moore’s (2005) 
book, the values of the Founding Fathers, as well as the public values of liberalism. 
 
What Are Values?  
Looking at the class of phenomena that is denoted by the concept of public values, we have 
established that this constitutes a very eclectic pantheon; but what then is the set of characteristics 
(the connotation) of the concept? According to classic definition theory, the characteristics of the 
concept should provide a “clear and distinct” means to identify what phenomena are included or 
not. We have seen two examples suggesting that this is not possible. Obviously, “public” is a core 
characteristic to distinguish within the class of values, so we will have to identify what values are. 
“Value” is a tricky concept, and its definition is be the object of study in this section, followed by 
considering the distinction between values and facts in the next. The most common approach to 
define “value” is by pointing at (more or less) synonymous concepts, such as preferences, desires, 
needs, and interests (cf. Mittelstrass, 1984, p. 622). Arguably, the most concise definition of value is 
provided by Perry: “A value is anything of interest to a human subject” (cited by Sills, 1968, p. 283; 
cf. Rescher, 1982, p. 4). Sills (1968) provides a slightly more specific definition, stating, “values to be 
conceptions of the desirable, influencing selective behavior” (p. 283; cf. Hodgkinson, 1978, p. 120). 
To pose values as concepts expressing “the desirable” distinguishes them from the undesired or 
rather the a-desired5; the implied common opposite is a concept denoting a fact (as discussed in the 
next section). Can we find a more clear definition? To begin with, let us turn to the discourse in the 
study of public administration. It turns out that most authors in the PVM and PVF discourse do not 
provide a definition of values, nor public values (cf. Van der Wal et al., 2013), and only offer 
synonyms (cf. Alford & O’Flynn, 2009). Spano (2009), however, does present a specific definition: 
“Every thing has a value when somebody is willing to face a sacrifice to get it, because he/she 
believes that the potential benefits outnumber the sacrifices” (p. 330). Others do not follow his 
example, probably because the links to a “sacrifice” and “to get it” seem rather economic or 
utilitarian, and not to fit easily with ethical, esthetic, religious, and other non-economic values. Beck-
Jørgensen (2006) uses Kluckhohn’s definition that is also used widely outside public administration: 
“A value is a conception, explicit or implicit, distinctive of an individual or characteristic of a group, 
of the desirable which influences the selection from available modes, means, and ends of action”  
 (p. 366). He also points out the possibility of implicit and explicit values and of values being more 
substantial versus the more trivial wanting: “‘the desirable’ (e.g., a virtuous life) in contrast to 
‘desired’ (e.g., a cold beer)” (Beck-Jørgensen, 2006, p. 367). Both Spano and Beck-Jørgensen, in 
common with several others, refer to the vast interdisciplinary literature on values that do not 
provide a more concrete definition of values. Limiting value to an economic perspective is generally 
rejected. For instance, Benington (2009, p. 237) points out the economic notions of exchange value, 
labor value, and use value, but stresses that, certainly in relation to the concept of public values, the 
concept needs to encompass ecological, political, social, and cultural dimensions of value. The 
difficulty to provide a substantial definition of value is not surprising when considering the concept’s 
history: Attempts to arrive at an encompassing and comprehensive value theory or axiology have 
remained fruitless ever since the mid-19th century when it gained popularity. Attempt to provide a 
definition of value resulted in enumerating synonyms and/or illustrations, just as nowadays. One of 
the later authors who attempted to construct a universal theory of values, William Stern (1924), 
makes the interesting observation that value is perhaps a base or fundamental concept that simply 
cannot be reduced to any other concept.6 It should be noted that it is not self-evident that an 
everyday term, such as value, can be expected to express one concise concept to begin with. This 
seems to be a characteristic of some other concepts as well: the (in) famous “essentially contested 
concepts.”7 These are often important core concepts used to identify and delineate areas of social 
action and research: power, integrity, politics, and public administration. It behooves an author to 
make explicit how he or she intends to use such a concept, because its meaning is so vague, 
contextual, and/or ideological. However, Rhodes and Wanna (2007, p. 408) suggest that it is 
precisely the vagueness that makes the concept pliable for all kind of uses in public management. It 
seems like a “magic concept,” as Pollitt and Hupe (2011), call it, that has “a broad scope, great 
flexibility, and positive ‘spin’” (p. 642). Nevertheless, the meaning of “value” is sometimes anything 
but fuzzy: For instance, when an expert in a television program such as “the Antiques Road Show” 
states, “This has only sentimental, no real value.” “Real value” is used to refer to money. It also 
indicates that value is not inherent to the phenomenon under consideration, but attributed to it in 
an evaluative judgment. Paraphrasing Stern (1927, p. 41): Value is not something, but something has 
value in the perception of an observer. This means that we give something—an idea, an object, a 
fantasy—a positive or negative meaning; we judge or evaluate it from some perspective. Something 
can thus have a monetary value, but also an emotional one, such as a memory, or a perception of 
beauty. Values are concepts we use to give meaning and significance to reality: We judge or qualify 
something as (among others) beautiful, courageous, honest, or holy, or on the contrary as ugly, 
cowardly, deceitful, or devilish. It is, however, almost a universal custom to refer to values only as a 
positive concept, that is, as about the desired. This was the case in earlier examples and can be 
further illustrated by Hodgkinson (1978): “concepts of the desirable with motivating force”  
 (p. 120). However, I would argue that a value can be any concept that expresses a positive or 
negative qualitative (or evaluative) statement and has a “motivating force,” that is, it gives direction 
to people’s thoughts and actions. It can be argued, for instance, that “integrity” and “corruption” are 
two terms denoting essentially the same value, be it in terms of a positive or a negative concept.8 
The existence of opposite pairs of values is ubiquitous: good and bad, freedom and bondage, honor 
and disgrace, brave and cowardly, and so on. The one value is to be attained, the other is to be 
prevented, but in both cases they are powerful concepts that are intended to give normative 
direction. This is not an opposition of valuable and invaluable or worthless, for “invaluable” suggests 
that it is simply without significance and/or normative force. A negative value is not just 
insignificant, but also gives direction as being reviled, despised, condemned, something to be 
actively avoided and rejected, not simply ignored. This is certainly not a new insight; indeed, it links 
back to Immanuel Kant’s argument that the conception of negation (from physics) can be applied to 
social inquiry.9 As it is usually easier to agree upon what people do not want, that is, value 
negatively, it may be a means to empirically arrive at consensus more easily than by only focusing on 
the positively desired. It does however also enhance the reproach that values concern everything, 
and thus nothing. Is the characteristic of values as concepts that express “the (un)desirable” 
adequate? Should we in the study of public administration indeed regard my preference for 
cappuccino over black coffee an expression of a relevant value? Should we not at least distinguish 
values from personal preferences? This is what Beck-Jørgensen was concerned with when opposing 
“the desirable” to the “desired.” There are attempts to arrive at some kind of distinction between 
the origins and grounding of values. Hodgkinson (1978), for instance, distinguishes three kinds of 
groundings of values, arguing that “thou shalt not kill” is an example of a metaphysically grounded 
value (p. 110). However, it seems equally possible to do so from a rational or an emotional 
perspective. It seems likely that values are underdetermined by possible groundings. Instead, we can 
look at the meaning of “valuing” as an activity in which we qualify something as funny, innovative, 
boring, uninteresting. To value or evaluate is always done from a specific perspective. Thus, a policy 
can be regarded as good or bad, depending on whether the evaluation takes as its focus whether the 
policy in question is democratic, effective, or legally sound. To value implies a measure or norm in 
the light of which something is appraised. This norm has to be derived from the value at hand (such 
as “democratic”), but it can also be a norm resulting from personal preference (“I prefer 
cappuccino”). There is always a judgment and this evaluation can be reasoned in terms of the values 
or preferences used in doing so. It seems better, however, not to regard the evaluations in terms of 
personal preferences for personal benefit (see also “Identifying Public Value” section) as valuations 
or evaluations in the primarily relevant meaning in the social and political context. Without delving 
too deeply into the issue, preferences are of a “lesser status” than values (including personal values 
such as “my honor”). A strict distinction between preferences and values (or, the desirable or the 
Desirable) seems unlikely. This brings us to a very different approach to try and define values; not in 
terms of characteristics of some value, but in terms of its functioning in human argumentation. This 
is central to the philosopher Nicolas Rescher’s (1982) approach: “A value represents a slogan for the 
‘rationalization’ of action” (p. 9; italics in original).10 Values function as arguments in rational debate 
concerning what to do or not to do, and are central to so-called “practical reasoning,” that is, in 
decisions on, and legitimizations of, our choices and actions: “To have a value is to be able to give 
reasons for motivating goal-oriented behavior in terms of benefits and costs, bringing to bear 
explicitly a conception of what is in a man’s interest and what goes against his interest”(Rescher, 
1982, p. 10). 
From this perspective (subjective) preferences provide weak arguments, (intersubjective) values, 
and certainly public values provide more forceful arguments. Rescher starts by discussing the role of 
values in the rationalization of actions. Rationalization is often regarded as the provision of 
arguments after a decision or act (certainly in psychology it has this ad-post meaning). This cannot 
be the sole meaning for Rescher, as he states that values have a function in “practical reasoning,” 
that is, the arguments used to arrive at a solution (i.e., not afterward) to resolve a practical, 
especially moral (“pragmatic”) problem (cf. Honderich, 1995, p. 709).11 We can thus also attribute 
to values more than “just” discursive meaning, that is, what has been referred to before as the 
motivating force of values for human thought and action. Going from Kluckhohn to Rescher, we have 
identified some important characteristics of the concept of value. What has not been dealt with is 
the distinction between values and their obvious opposites, facts. At face value, this might provide a 
clear delineation of the meaning of value. 
 
Facts and Values  
An everyday means to characterize values is by simply opposing them to facts. It is surprising that 
the fact/value distinction does not figure in the debates, despite the fact that both the PVM and PVF 
discourse distance themselves from forerunners (NPM) or approaches (economic market failure 
theory) that are characterized by fairly strong orientations toward “facts and figures.” What is more, 
opposition of meaning (dichotomy) is actually one of the most important and powerful semantic 
relations (Lyons, 1971, p. 461). The possibility to debate what constitutes a fact is perhaps not 
immediately obvious when talking about everyday observations such as “it is raining” or “my cat is 
climbing the tree,” but in the case of complex social issues—which are the concern of public 
administration—it is just as obvious that facts are by no means straightforward. Even if we agree on 
what are facts, it is not the facts as such that matter, but which ones are relevant or meaningful, that 
is, valuable: Appraisal is an essential part of public administration (Self, 1982, p. 192). This may range 
from weighing the visual impact of a new building on a skyline to evaluating the risks of a terrorist 
attack. The criteria for judging relevance and meaning in all such assessments are primarily public 
values: Is it legal, efficient, democratic, is it a public concern to begin with? It should also be noted 
that even the most factual concepts bring more than just a descriptive meaning. For instance, 
“policy” has normative meanings distinguishing it from politics. This example also brings with it a 
cultural trait: We can talk meaningfully about policy and politics as distinct concepts in English, but 
that is not the case in many other languages (or in previous times; cf. Rutgers, 1996). The discussion 
of facts and values (or description and prescription for that matter) can be aided by using the more 
all-encompassing epistemological notion of normativity. Railton (2000) regards this as the most 
important concept used by philosophers to refer to a number of crucial phenomena. Normativity 
transcends fact and value; it is not in opposition to descriptive or factual, and thus not limited to 
valuations, evaluations, and prescriptions. The notion that facts and values can be entirely separated 
is what Putnam (2002) calls a “thought-stopper” (p. 44). The notion is misleadingly implying that all 
values are just irrational and subjective preferences, in contrast to facts, which have some objective 
status. The idea of distinguishing two separate “realms” is, for instance, used by Hodgkinson. 
Although Hodgkinson (1978) is keenly aware of “the world of overlapping value and fact” (p. 104), he 
also states that facts and values are substantially different: Facts are somehow “true” and 
objectively verifiable, while values are not true or false (p. 105). The plausibility of the fact–value 
bifurcation depends entirely upon the possibility to keep “facts” pure, that is, unaffected by a human 
observer. It has been well established that this is impossible, which has hardly been a point of 
discussion ever since Karl Popper pointed out that all observation is theory-loaded or guided. 
Humans do not simply receive objective information; there is always interpretation and appraisal (cf. 
Dancy, 2000, pp. xiii-xiv); in other words, we select and give meaning to our perceptions. As Putnam 
(2002) states, “Values and normativity permeate all of experience” (p. 30). The recognition that all 
meaning is normative is influential among present-day philosophers.12 Rothstein (1975, p. 307) 
argues that both facts and values constitute arguments that can be evaluated in terms of coherence, 
reasonableness, and correspondence with the existing body of knowledge: The distinction is only 
analytic (p. 308). This fits Rescher’s interpretation of values as rational arguments. The values on 
which we base our norms for descriptions as well as for evaluative purposes are socially 
determined.13 They are shared to a high degree in a society or culture, even though there will be no 
clarity about their precise meaning and there is room for discussion of the relevant norm (“is this 
justified or not?”). This is not essentially different from debating whether something is red or 
orange, even though it seems easier to arrive at a shared norm for deciding on naming a color, but 
this is obviously trickier in the case of complex social and moral values. Those values have a cultural 
embedding and origin is hardly new. It reflects Ricoeur’s (2004) notion that the appropriation of a 
value is not some isolated, solitary phenomenon, but is always mediated by “the other”: It is not a 
purely individual event, but relational in time and space. This links with Rescher’s observation that 
values are interpersonal and therefore in a sense impersonal. We cannot simply pose or invent 
values ourselves; values characterize a culture and group; valuing is a socially established (learned) 
phenomenon. This is an insight that will have a bearing on the very foundation of public values. In 
administrative practice, the distinction between facts and values is extra difficult because many 
terms have no fixed or clear meaning. That makes it difficult to assess whether a term is used 
descriptive or evaluative to begin with, or whether it is a positive or negative evaluation (for 
instance, “deregulation,” “specialization,” “flexibility,” to name but a few examples from reviews). 
This underlines the remark by Rothstein that the fact–value distinction is only analytical and can thus 
“evaporate” in social practice as making sense or providing guidance in establishing meaning. On the 
face of it, it is not clear whether the statement “this is a bureaucratic organization” is descriptive or 
evaluative, and in case it is the latter, whether it is positive or negative. The intertwinement of fact 
and value is perhaps best known in relation to so-called “thick concepts” (Putnam, 2002, p. 35). 
Examples are “cruel” and “friendly.” I would argue that most, if not all concepts in natural languages, 
can have both a descriptive and evaluative meaning, not just thick concepts. For instance, “Turn 
right after the ugly building” uses an evaluative term for descriptive purposes, just as “blond” can be 
used descriptive as well as evaluative. Many descriptive terms are associated with, or used as, 
evaluative terms. Thus, in the sciences an attempt is made to make descriptions as value free as 
possible14; in the practice of politics and administration that would seem to be even more 
impossible. We have to deal somehow with the very normativity of administrative reality. The social 
nature of values and valuing brings us finally to an important founding question with regard to public 
values: Are public values some kind of sum of personal values, or do public values have a different 
kind of ontology? 
 
The Ontology of Public Values  
Arguably, the most elaborate and in-depth discussion of the concept of value in recent Public 
Administration is by Meynhardt (2009), who regards value as “one of those ambiguous container 
terms with enormous promise of insight but no widespread consensus” (p. 196). He refers to the 
philosopher Rescher (whose value theory will figure later on), as having shown that all attempts 
have failed to get a more precise “value terminology.” Core problems in value theory are discussed 
by Meynhardt, such as the question whether values only have a subjective status, or perhaps also an 
objective meaning. In the end, he uses psychological theory concerning human, individuals’ needs to 
find a foundation for his use of value. This brings us to an important conclusion of Meynhardt that 
suggests a firm foundation for understanding what value is: “the basic idea that public value starts 
and ends within the individual” (p. 215; in original). However, likely from a (social-) psychological 
approach, it does by no means make it self-evident that public value is properly understood and 
analyzed in terms of the values of individuals. Public value not only relates to a notion of the public 
as the object of the value in question but also as the origin or foundation, that is, that it derives its 
meaning not so much from an individual’s values, but is intrinsically linked to a collective notion such 
as “the general interest” even though this brings in a host of new problems.15 Also Meynhardt 
points at the necessity to look “beyond” the individual when he states that public value is as much 
“outside” the individual, that is, in between individual and group (or public). So what then is the 
origin or ontology of public values? Do they have an individualistic or personal origin, or a social or 
cultural basis.16 This is of particular importance for, if the origins of public values are to be traced 
back to values held by individuals, that is, the actor level, it seems likely that public values can be 
established by somehow tracing and adding up these individual values, with a mechanism to resolve 
conflicts between them. If, however, public values have their origins at a system level, that is, in 
culture, the identifications of public values becomes a different matter: It will require politics and/or 
argumentation. The ontology of public values is nothing less than the major question concerning the 
very ontology of the social sciences. In the ongoing discourse on public values, the dominant, implicit 
opinion is that individuals possess values and that public values are somehow reducible to these 
privately conceived values. As we have seen, Meynhardt states this for instance explicitly. Bozeman 
(2007), who opposes an individualistic economic approach to public values, nevertheless seems to 
provide public values with an individualistic basis insofar as consensus is a core criterion for public 
values (and consensus is regarded the result of individuals interacting). From an individualistic 
perspective, the only legitimate public values are reducible to individual’s (private) values, or, even 
more limited, concern mere market failure. In particular, the latter may result in what Bozeman 
(2002, 2007) opposes as “PVF.” An example is that, from a market perspective, a business trafficking 
in human organs could be regarded successful, even though it violates human rights (Bozeman, 
2007, pp. 134-138). Obviously, this argument implies that public values impede private values and 
consequent actions. At the same time, public values seem nevertheless to transcend individuality at 
least in consensus, or in what Benington and Moore (2011b) refer to as “the social consciousness of 
interdependence” (p. 259). Moore (2013) also states that the public or the collective is his starting 
point, not private or individual values. He captures this in phrases, such as “the collective arbiter of 
value” (p. 58). This requires him to differentiate between individual, personal values, and values as a 
citizen, that is, as representing the collective “we.” Here, the whole issue of what is a public value 
draws in the vast debate on what is democracy, public interest, and so on. If public value research 
cannot somehow delineate its core concept, it unavoidably draws in the whole set of problems of 
political philosophy and practice.17 Meynhardt (2009), although taking the individual as his starting 
point, draws the conclusion that value “expresses subjectivity and is bound to relationships” (pp. 
199, 213). He even criticizes Moore and others for not delving into the roots of public values in 
human nature. This links to Rescher, pointing out the inherent link between values and ideas about 
the good life: fundamental beliefs about human nature and society. Insofar as we are dealing with 
public values, Meynhardt’s grounding of public values in psychological theory seems to imply a 
reductionist perspective, and this does indeed seem to be the case when he equates basic values 
and basic needs. However, needs too are species and/or culture specific. There are more arguments 
to doubt the individualistic ontology of values. For instance, as also Meynhardt acknowledges, an 
individual develops himself or herself in relation and confrontation with fellow humans; in fact, the 
very notion of individuality is in the end a social construct. Also what we regard as private, that is, 
the values we use to delineate a private from a public sphere, can probably be best conceptualized 
as a subset of public values. In other words, what are regarded as legitimate private values is 
demarcated from the perspective of the public sphere, rather than the other way around. There can 
be good reasons to interfere in the private sphere because important (public) values are under 
threat. This implies that private, personal, or individual values do not precede the social; on the 
contrary, they presuppose or build upon a social context. Even in the case of “purely subjective” 
preferences, social conventions play a major role in what will be accepted as a value and (thus) as a 
valid argument. Preferences such as coffee or tea, Lady Gaga or Mozart are specific to time and 
place and presuppose an encompassing social sphere, and indicate that there is a limited range 
within which individuality can be expressed and experienced. Oyserman (2001) makes an interesting 
distinction when discussing the nature of values that may indicate how to resolve the matter. He 
simply observes that values can be conceptualized at group and individual level: First, “At the 
individual level values are internalized social representations or moral beliefs that people appeal to 
as the ultimate rationale for their actions” (p. 16151). This is where differences in personal 
preferences have a place and the use of values when explaining or legitimizing individual behavior in 
terms of someone’s values. Second, values at group level refer to cultural ideals shared by members 
of a group: “Values are codes or general principles guiding action, they are not the actions 
themselves nor are they specific checklists of what to do and when to do it” (Oyserman, 2001, p. 
16151). It makes sense to locate public values at the group level. As a consequence, “citizen 
satisfaction” is a possible public value, but a person’s individual satisfaction with some product or 
service is not, nor the simple sum of such perceptions. The assessment whether or not “customer 
service” is met from a public perspective is a different matter. This brings in a host of well-known 
issues related to the way we can establish “the public interest” or the like. It will somehow involve a 
legitimate procedure to arrive at acceptable decisions. The concept of public values as such is hardly 
any help in resolving this, however, it shows that the interstices of private (value or preferences) and 
public (value or interest) are a prime consideration. 
 
Identifying Public Value  
This brings us finally to the concept of public value as the new core concept. Van der Wal et al. 
(2013) analyzed 397 publications on “public values”; only 87 provided a definition of public values, 
27 of which provided their own definition: “each of these definitions is used less than ten times, 
suggesting again that the study of PVs is scattered and fragmented.” As stated in the introduction, 
the concept of public values is hardly discussed and is regarded as a matter of common sense. Thus, 
Coats and Passmore (2008) simply put forward an analogy: “Public value is the analogue of the 
desire to maximize shareholder value in the private sector” (2008, p. 4). One may wonder whether 
this is really enlightening or results just as much in new blinkers. Others use vague entries and refer 
to related, yet different concepts, such as “public goods,” “public interest,” or “public benefit” (cf. 
Alford & O’Flynn, 2009, p. 175). One of the few authors to expound on their concept of public values 
is Bozeman. He provides an elaborate definition, which is often cited: “A society’s “public values” are 
those providing normative consensus about (a) the rights, benefits, and prerogatives to which 
citizens should (and should not) be entitled; (b) the obligations of citizens to society, the state, and 
one another; and (c) the principles on which governments and policies should be based (Bozeman, 
2007, p. 13)”. 
What is more, Bozeman opposes public values explicitly to public interests. His “workable definition” 
of the latter reads: “In a particular context, the public interest refers to the outcomes best serving 
the long-run survival and wellbeing of a social collective as a ‘public’” (2007, p. 12). This suggests 
that contrary to public values, the public interest is not a matter of consensus: “A most important 
distinction between public interest and public value is that . . . ‘public interest’ is an ideal, whereas 
‘public values’ have specific, identifiable content” (p. 12). It seems a difficult distinction to work with, 
but Bozeman tries elegantly to define away a major problem of distinguishing between public values 
as fairly changeable, versus the idea of some objective, “ideal” perception of what is good for 
society: the summum bonum. Alternatively, what is accepted as ideal or as a shared vision on society 
as a whole is a matter of (specific) public values having become accepted as such; that is, some 
public values have more general enduring acceptance. In this respect, it is perhaps surprising that in 
an earlier work Bozeman actually refers to the lack of consensus that is so central in his definition: 
“Clearly the lack of consensus on public values tempers our ability to develop simple analytical tools” 
(Bozeman, 2002, p. 150). I suggest we should stick to the notion of public values as being primarily 
about the (perceived) general or public interest, and thus not concerning someone’s personal 
interest. Benington (2009, pp. 233-234; 2011, p. 42) distinguishes two aspects of public value: First, 
what the public values, and second, what adds value to the public sphere. However, “what the 
public values” is not automatically a public value, but it can be a generally shared private value. For 
instance, if everyone values having a television, a nice couch or kitchen, that doesn’t make it a public 
value. The second aspect Benington mentions is therefore crucial. Showing that access to television 
important for children’s education and social participation, and thus in the public interest can result 
in proposing that providing families with children access to a computer is a public value.18 In other 
words, that someone values social justice, fair ages, oppose child labor, or (sticking to an earlier 
example) prefers cappuccino does not make personal values public values, but that they are when 
proposed or reasoned as being in the general interest, the common good, the summum bonum, or 
the like: “what the public values as public.” Clearly, such a claim can and should be backed by other 
arguments and will gain impetus if shown that it is supported by other people as being linked to “the 
good of the commonwealth” (and not just in the interest of some specific group for itself). Public 
values understood as values regarding a collectives’ “long-term survival and well-being” can include 
morally values, as well as be at odds with other more immediate (perhaps “short term”) public 
values. However, whether or not there is some kind of (temporary or enduring) consensus concerns 
a different question and should perhaps best be left out of the definition of public values as such. Of 
course, we have to reflect on the preconditions for public values. This concerns the very notion of 
public, the public sphere (Bozeman & Johnson, 2014; Moulton, 2009; Nabatchi, 2012), and the 
political mechanisms that create and change public values. “Democracy” is an example of an 
enduring, idealized public value how to arrive at establishing proposed public values as directive for 
collective action. A similar circularity applies to other “great” public values that are constitutive for 
the (prevalent) notion of the public sphere (cf. Kairyst, 2003 on the rule of law). Public values are 
values that concern the general interest, whatever that is: The two cannot really be defined 
independently, and some circularity seems unavoidable, for we are dealing with base concepts for 
understanding social reality. Besides Bozeman, Meynhardt’s (2009) is one of the few to provide a 
definition of public values: “Public value is what impacts on values about the ‘public’” (p. 206), and 
arrives, inter alia, at a psychological theory of needs. Slightly different from Benington, he argues 
that public value is perhaps something that affects values, that is, “values about the ‘public’”: “It is 
about the values held about the relationship between an individual and a social entity (constructs 
like groups, community, state, nation) that characterize the quality of this relationship” (Meynhardt, 
2009,  
 p. 206). This fits with broadly accepted public values such as justice, democracy, or rule of law. We 
can also add “relationships between groups,” put differently, it concerns an image of humanity and 
of society, including the important distinction between public and private. Although Meynhardt 
rejects references to the “common good,” it is unavoidable that this implies a notion of “the good 
life” or “the good society.” As Rescher (1982) argues, any substantial concept of values is “a vision of 
the good life” and “a vision of how life ought to be lived” (p. 10). Public values are specific values 
that concern “the good society” or “the general interest,” that is, the sustainability of society and the 
well-being of its members, irrespective of immediate personal preferences or interests. 
 
Final Observations  
At the beginning of this article, the question was raised of how the concept of public value is 
constructed as a core concept for studying public administration. There appears to be at least three 
different ways the term public value is used in contemporary discourses. First, to refer to a specific 
value as being important in relation to “the public” (justice, democracy, freedom, health, and so on). 
Attention is on the meaning of these specific public values, while the meaning of the concept of 
public values is simply presupposed as unproblematic. Authors in both the PVM and PVF discourses 
are primarily concerned with the question of how to identify and achieve these public values. 
Second, the term public value is used as a generic (“second order”) concept to denote the totality of 
possible public values in the first sense. Few attempt a “clear and distinct” definition, but as a 
pantheon concept it is likely that there is no identifiable singular set of characteristics for all public 
values. A more universal or broader definition will probably demand what Wittgenstein (1976) 
referred to as a “family resemblance” (p. 66). Wittgenstein himself uses the concept of a “game” as 
an example (p. 67): Some are fun, some are cruel, some are individual and others team sports, and 
so on; there is no singular set of characteristics all games share, just as family members differ.19 
What is more, definitions of public value somehow end up in circularity by having to refer to “the 
common good,” “the Good Life,” and vice versa as constituting the ultimate public value(s). A similar 
issue of circularities applies also to the equally presupposed assumption of a distinction between 
public and private. Third, contrary to the previous two, the term public values is used not to denote 
a concept or object of study, but an approach to study public administration. An instance, being 
Benington and Moore’s (2011b) remark: “The future of public value is bright” (p. 274).20 To avoid 
confusion, it is preferable to refrain from using public value in this sense, and use a specific name, 
such as PVM. Worse still from the perspective of avoiding confusion is to make a difference between 
singular and plural names as to refer to PVM as “public value” and PVF as “public values” (PVF; cf. 
Nabatchi, 2012, p. 699). The concept of values remains either underdeveloped or proves to involve a 
fairly complex (interdisciplinary) conceptualization, as Meynhardt, for instance, shows. It seems 
unlikely that a single conceptualization of public values can resolve existing vagueness and 
ambiguity, and thus provide a clearer focus for theory and, in particular, praxis. This is reflected in 
observations such as “ . . . the concept of public value(s) is not as unitary in meaning and usage as 
many people would like it to be” (Van der Wal & Van Hout, 2009, p. 227). In fact, the focus on public 
values results in the introduction of almost all conceivable disciplinary and philosophical issues the 
field has encountered over the decades. There remains an important way in which public values may 
indeed be a helpful concept; not as a well-defined theoretical concept to guide action, but as a 
regulative idea (Meynhardt, 2009, p. 204) to help identify important issues. This is similar to John 
Rohr’s use of the concept of regime values as a guide for action for bureaucrats: It is not a 
theoretically precise concept, but primarily a pedagogical instrument (Rohr, 1989, p. 68; cf. 
Overeem, 2014). In a similar way, public value is used as a heuristic. Thus, Bozeman’s PVF framework 
is a heuristic device to identify important consequences that may possibly be overlooked, and 
Moore’s public value score card is a heuristic tool for public managers: As Talbot (2008) suggests, the 
“public value score card” functions as a kind of “operational definition of public value” for Moore (p. 
3). As a heuristic, public value can assist to put administrative phenomena in a different light, 
although there is limited clarity regarding the nature of public values themselves it helps avoid 
focusing on facts as easy, undisputable starting points. However, at a conceptual level, we seem to 
be confronted with the same sentiment as March (1989) indicated when discussing the concept of 
power as “a residual category for explanation” (p. 148), going on to state: “On the whole, power is a 
disappointing concept” (p. 149). Just as power is a generally used concept, we could do with more 
proof that public value has value as a core concept. Also similar is that power somehow implies a 
causal relation (“the ability to influence other people’s behavior”), but it is equally difficult to 
establish how (public) values actually influence behavior. To conclude, let me suggest a tentative, 
perhaps slightly absurd, encompassing definition of public values taking into account the previous 
observations: Public values are enduring beliefs in the organization of and activities in a society that 
are regarded as crucial or desirable—positively or negatively—for the existence, functioning, and 
sustainability of that society—instant or distant—the well-being of its members—directly or 
indirectly, and present and/or future—in reference to an—implicit or explicit—encompassing 
normative ideal of human society—the Good Society, the Common Wealth, the General Interest—
that give meaning, direction, and legitimation to collective action as they function as arguments in 
the formulation, legitimation, and evaluation of such—proposed or executed—collective actions. 
They may or may not be posed or embraced by either an individual, collectives, and/or the entire 
political community, thus create consensus, or be the object of debate and twist. The previous 
definition tries to capture most of the aspects discussed previously (and actually a bit more). 
Depending on the normative (descriptive and prescriptive) intentions, characteristics may be 
excluded or included (such as Bozeman’s specification in terms of “rights benefits and prerogatives”) 
or, I would suggest a specific sub-group of public values concerning the nature and behavior of 
those, the public functionaries—political or administrative, and amateur or professional—who have 
to ensure that public values are identified, legitimized, attained, and maintained.21 The final line of 
the definition indicates that it is possible for an individual to regard something a public value, and 
that at the other extreme, consent of all members of a polity before a value is considered “public.” 
Undoubtedly more characteristics can or should be added. As indicated, circularity is difficult to 
avoid, and no public value can include all characteristics simultaneously. Although a lot is included, 
also contrasting characteristics, the preconditions for public value, such as the social context, the 
distinction(s) between what is regarded public (or private), or the political regime are left out. On 
one hand, public value is a crucial concept as public administration is focused on their creation, 
legitimation, execution, and formulation. On the other hand, the danger is that it is a kind of neo-
axiology: A way to broad and fuzzy concept that somehow has to include all administrative 
phenomena. The stance that public value is a valuable core concept is not entirely convincing. It is 
difficult to pinpoint its meaning and make it truly a clear concept for thought and action. Even a clear 
distinction between facts and values proves tricky; but it stressed that public administration can 
never pretend to limit itself to facts. Looking at the many attempts over the decades, may be a fuzzy 
concept of public value is “as good as it gets.” 
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Notes  
1. Of course, depending on one’s aim other “schools” may be pointed out. Thus, Bozeman and 
Johnson (2014) distinguish three (public policy, management, and normative) approaches and in 
Rutgers (2012) I added public ethics as a separate discourse, but the public service motivation 
literature may perhaps also be stipulated as focusing on public values.  
2. Schein is one of the most influential authors on organizational culture (cf. Brocklehurst, 1998, p. 
452).  
3. “Values with large numbers of related values we label nodal values. They appear to occupy a 
central position in a network of values . . . we prefer the term nodal because there is less implication 
that the value is necessarily more important than others” (Beck-Jørgensen & Bozeman, 2006, pp. 
370-371).  
4. The pantheon was a temple in Rome devoted to all gods or divinities in the Roman Empire: It is 
the original “hall of fame.” Being devoted to all possible divinities, the pantheon contains a rather 
eclectic if not anarchistic company of principal and less well known, even very obscure gods, 
goddesses, and the like.  
5. The opposite is not necessarily the opposite, that is, the unwanted, by simply that which is not 
(understood as) an object of desire. Thus, a fact as such is neutral in relation to its desirability: It can 
be valued positively or negatively. See also later on: Values can be positive and negative.  
6. “Eine Definition des Wertbegriffes ist nicht möglich; denn es gibt keinen anderen elementaren 
Begriff, auf den er zurückgeführt werden könnte” (Stern, 1927, p. 41). A similar difficulty concerns, 
for instance, defining the concept of concepts, yet we cannot do without it (cf. Peterson, 1984).  
7. This expression is usually attributed to Connolly (1984).  
8. In this example, both values actually rely on the same metaphor of the body as being either whole 
and healthy, or diseased and mutilated. Oppositeness of meaning is a most important semantic 
relation. Ferdinand de Saussure argued that in any language values or meanings are established by 
means of either opposition (dichotomy) or similarity (synonymy; cf. Lyons, 1971, p. 461).  
9. A negative magnitude is not just a negation, but a magnitude on its own with a different 
orientation; that is, it is negative insofar as it neutralizes an opposite magnitude (Kant, 1763/1981, p. 
786).  
10. This is in line with the notion of normativity that is discussed later on: For instance, Raz (2000, p. 
34) argues that all normativity is closely linked with reason and rationality. Dancy also makes a close 
connection between normativity and rationality: “Now nobody denies that the notion of a reason is 
central to that of normativity” (Dancy, 2000, p. viii).  
11. I would argue that rational argumentation and rationalization afterward are closely related (cf.–
Rutgers & Schreurs, 2003).  
12. The thesis of the normativity of meaning originates from the work of Kripke (1982). Of course, 
there are also counterarguments, both against the normativity of meaning, as against its 
implications for naturalism (cf. Hattiangadi, 2006; Papineau & Tanney, 1999).  
13. To be able to formulate correctly, we have to apply terms according to their rules of application: 
“If I mean something by an expression . . . then I should use it in certain ways” (Wikforss, 2001, p. 2; 
cf. Hattiangadi, 2006, p. 220). At a minimum, this implies that the normativity of meaning results in 
blurring the boundaries between normative and non-normative (i.e., between facts and values; cf. 
Gibbard, 2003, p. 84). 
14. Nevertheless, in the sciences things are not always clear, either. For instance, in the introduction 
to Darwin’s Origin of Species, he points at “natural selection” and “struggle for life” as quickly 
seeming to imply normative associations with conscious processes (Wallace, 1998, p. XVI). That, 
according to Wallace (1998), is the source of many misinterpretations of Darwin’s evolutionary 
theory, even if Darwin’s terminology has by now become part of everyday vocabulary.  
15. At the same time, this brings again back in a lot of difficulties, if not simply because “the general 
interest” is almost synonymous to public and equally vague and confusing (Alford & O’Flynn, 2009, 
p. 175; cf. Bozeman, 2002, p. 148; King, Chilton, & Roberts, 2010).  
16. The issue discussed here does not concern values as either subjective or objective; the prime aim 
is to establish the ontological status of public values versus private or personal values.  
17. As can be argued is indeed happening in Moore’s (2013) book.  
18. In fact, this is not a made-up argument, the Netherlands cable companies have obligation to 
provide a cheap basic set of channels to all families, the choice of channels being controlled by a 
citizen panel.  
19. Wittgenstein (1965) actually rejects “our craving for generality” (p. 18). This implies that there is 
no singular set of characteristics (connotation) available. There may even be opposing qualities, and 
as a consequence these characteristics will not simultaneously fit a specific use of the concept.  
20. This replicates the well-known confusion resulting from using the same term “public 
administration” to refer to both the object of study and the actual study itself, as opposed to, for 
instance, politics, economy, and society (or the social) for political science, economics, and sociology, 
respectively.  
21. To include special attention to public functionaries as the people who have been granted specific 
public authority to intervene in others people’s lives, concerns an important public value for the 
study of public administration. It acknowledges that public functionaries have a special responsibility 
to help identify, formulate, and even contribute to arriving at shared or at least legitimate public 
values and how these affect specific, actual goals, and ends (i.e., actions) for their realization. 
 
 
